Astroturfing Regulators: Evidence from Comment Letters to the SEC

Abstract

In this study, we examine the practice of “astroturfing” directed at financial regulators. Astroturfing is when unseen sponsors of a message (e.g., supporting or opposing proposed regulation) make it appear as if support or opposition originates from grassroots participants. To examine astroturfing, we use comment letters to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). We seek to answer several related research questions. (1) What is the prevalence of astroturf lobbying among SEC proposals? (2) What types of proposals are targeted? (3) Is there any crossover with specific, identified lobbyists or lobbying groups? (4) Does astroturfing appear to be effective at influencing the progression of proposals to final rules? Overall, this study will contribute to the understanding of how various stakeholders participate in the financial regulatory process, including the use of duplicity to advance specific messages and affect regulation.

Tong Wang

Senior Lecturer in Business Economics

My research interests include Economics Theory, Crypto-finance and Digital Economics.